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ABSTRACT 
Tendering process is utilized by principal to 
invited capable tenderer to participate in 
competitive bid for winning a large project. Due 
to advent of IT infrastructure, E-tendering is 
introduced and adopted in many countries. Yet, 
an electronic environment did not promise 
curbing collusion between principal and certain 
tenderers. Other than common threats to system 
like security breaches by malicious parties, 
security issue related to ethical issue like fraud 
and repudiation issue where no evidence existed 
to denied it. In this paper, common threats for e-
tendering process altogether with security 
countermeasure are described. This three 
interrelated attribute (consist of tender phase, 
threat and security countermeasure) are 
illustrated in misuse case for better 
understanding of the risk that may occurs in 
particular tender phase. Furthermore, it sought to 
ease the system developer for designing and 
constructing a secure e-tendering system.  
Keyword: e-Tendering, Security threats and 
counter measure; misuse case. 
I. I TRODUCTIO   
The emergences of information technology (IT) 
have been affecting all of organization activities 
including tendering. Construction industry has 
changed in order to keep up to grow of 
technology. Information and communication 
technology (ICT) help and ease most business 
and government institution. In business, the 
parties used to communicate and enter in 
contract. Hence, electronic tendering was 
introduced. E-tendering is adopted through 
many countries. This system serves as electronic 
environment. Compare to base tender process 
document archiving are more efficient and 
effective. 
Although electronic based systems provide 
opportunities for improved business processes 
which are lead to paperless, reduced reliance on 
human capability during transaction, reduced 
costs and shortened evaluation period (Lou 
&Alshawi, 2009), these systems still remain 
uncertainty in issues relating to legal and 
security compliance perspectives (Betts et al., 
2006), vague security framework, ownership of 
intellectual property, and the 
capture/management of the knowledge 
generated during the project, as well as issues of 
trust transaction (Rezguiet al, 2004; Brewer, et 
al , 2005; Pasupathinathan&Pieprzyk, 2008; 
Kumar Dey, Noor Nabi & Anwer, 2009).  In 
addition, the major risks factors relating to 
electronic transactions on the internet such as 
hacking, viruses, pirating, illegal trading, fraud, 
money laundry, defamatory libel (Darlington, 
2006) have very destructive impacts on trust and 
transparency in the process of tendering 
(Dara&Gundemoni, 2006) and also undermining 
of tendering data (Oyediran&Akintola, 
2011).Thus, to make an e-tendering process 
totally secure, identifying all possible threats and 
determining potential solution to discover the 
threats are absolutely vital. 
Currently in Malaysian practice, open tendering 
is applied for procurements above 
RM200,000.00.  For tenders that target for local 
suppliers, the bidding period is 21 days and if 
the required goods or services are not available 
locally, the bidding will be opened to 
international tenderers for 56 days.  As 
mentioned by Hui, Othman, Omar, Abdul 
Rahman and Harun (2011), tendering system is 
always involved with issues of accountability, 
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transparency, corruption, integrity and cronyism. 
As example in cronyism and corruption, there 
are occurrence of information leakage to closely 
relative or friend as a hint to win a tender 
competition. However, the existing e-tendering 
system is still lack in addressing integrity, 
confidentiality, authentication and non-
repudiation in e-tendering requirements.    Thus, 
one of the challenges in developing an e-
tendering system is to ensure the system 
requirements include the function for secure and 
trusted environment.   
II. OVERVIEW OF TE DERI G 
PROCESS 
Tendering is an invitation to relevant parties to 
make an offer to the principal, which must be 
capable of accepting the offer thereby creating a 
legally binding contract (Thrope and Bailey, 
1996 & Atlas et al, 1993). There are two parties 
that involve in this tendering process: 1) 
Principal.Any party inviting and receiving 
tenders. A principal may include contractor or 
sub contractor (AS 4120, 1994).And 2) 
Tenderer.Any party submitting tenders, 
including contractor, subcontractor and supplier 
(AS 4120, 1994). 
Basically there are four (4) stages in the 
tendering process: Qualification and compilation 
of the tender list, tender invitation and 
submission, tender assessment and tender 
acceptance (Working Group 3, 1997). 
Meanwhile,according to Australian Standard 
Code of Tendering (AS 4120-1994), a standard 
tendering process contains seven (7) components 
which are the extension from the basic tendering 
phase. Those components are Pre-qualification 
and Registration, Public invitation, Tender 
Submission, Close of Tender, Tender 
Evaluation, Award of Tender, and Archiving. 
III. E-TE DERI G PROCESS 
E-tendering is described as the electronic 
publishing, communicating, accessing, receiving 
and submitting of all tender related information 
and documentation via the internet, thereby 
replacing the traditional paper-based tender 
processes, and achieving a more efficient and 
effective business process for all parties 
involved (NT Government; NSW Department of 
Commerce) (AS 4120, 1994). 
E-tendering process is very familiar with the 
traditional tender process, but the procedure of 
tendering for particular system may vary. This 
common feature of e-tendering are mapped 
against the general component of conventional 
tender process as shown in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Correlation between E-Tendering System 
Components and Australian Standard Code of Tendering 
procedures 
Tendering System 
Component 
E-tendering Basic System Function 
Pre-qualification & 
registration  
Pre-Qualification Registration  
Issue user name and password 
Public Invitation  Tender Advertisment 
Tenderer views tender advertisement 
and notice 
Tender submission  Tenderer Registration to Tender for a 
Project 
Download tender document  
Tenderer submit tender 
Close of tender Close tender 
Principal Opens Tender 
Tender evaluation  Tender Evaluation Process 
Request for Information  
Award Tender/Acceptance of tender 
Award of Tender 
Sign the Formal Agreement  
Archiving  Retention of Document 
 
IV. E-TE DERI G SECURITY 
THREAT 
Threat is the potential activity that could lead to 
vulnerability of the system (Gregory, 2010). To 
develop a secure system, threat identification is 
important in eliciting the security requirement of 
the system. Basically, there are nine (9) basic 
threats in information system (McGuire, 2000). 
However, through the deep finding in common 
threat in e-commerce (Songtao, 2011) and e-
tendering article (Betts et al, 2006), there are six 
(6) main threats particularly in e-tendering 
(Dawson et al, 2006) and there are 1) Integrity 
violation:Malicious party change, alter or delete 
the information or document that should or have 
been done by qualified tenderer or principal 
committee; 2) Confidential violation:Malicious 
party view sensitive information of qualified 
tenderer or principal progress unauthorized; 3) 
Impersonate:Commonly in term of identify 
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fraud, malicious party gain access of real 
qualified tenderer activities or impersonating as 
principal host for tender; 4) Non-verifiable 
evidence:The tenderer may claim that they are 
unable to prepare document due to lack of 
notification or clarification allowing to claim 
their right to be treated fairly as other tenderer; 
5) Denial of service:Service host maybe unable 
to process user request or submission due to 
technical problem; 6) Repudiation: Either 
principal or tenderer may able to deny content or 
deadline of tender document causing a dispute 
principal and tender. When one of side of party 
claim this denial, the opposition cannot deny the 
claim. State when this of threats may occurs 
during tender process. 
V. COU TERMEASURE FOR 
SECURITY THREATS 
The basic security requirement components are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Apart 
from that, there are also some paper that been 
indentify the security requirement that 
specifically for e-Tendering. Research that been 
done by Du et al (2006) identify there are 4 
security services that need to provide to the 
protocol. There are confidentiality, data origin 
authentication, original integrity confirmation 
and system reliability. Meanwhile Mohammadi 
and Jahanshahi (2009), they found that e-
tendering security requirement are non- 
repudiation and authentication, secure time and 
secure record keeping. Although several 
legislation mostly focus on integrity, 
confidentiality and some on availability, Non-
repudiation (Rodriquez et al, 2011, Hu, 2011; 
Mohd Mahfuzur, Karim & Aliar, 2010) is 
crucial in order to handle legal compliance in 
case of providing evidence to negate or officially 
accept a business transaction on agreement is 
fulfill legally.  
In e-Tendering process, keeping the confidential 
in communication is important. Confidentiality 
in computer system aims to avoid leaking of 
sensitive information during communication 
(Betts et al, 2006). Cryptography encryption 
mechanism can be utilize to ensure the 
confidentiality of the system. There are two type 
of encryption; symmetric key encryption and 
asymmetric key encryption. This mechanism 
enable only the authorized person to view the 
data transaction by using their own private key 
which is use to decrypt and encrypt the message.  
Integrity of system is property to make the 
protected data from original source cannot be 
manipulated by malicious party. In legal 
perspective, it is vital for a system such like e-
Tendering system to maintain the integrity 
ensuring the reliability of the system. For 
instance, keeping the integrity of the tender box 
by not comprising the flouting the rules of 
confidentiality. For instance as the data 
transmitted on a network, it is trivial to change 
or accidentally change the value of byte in the 
message. To ensure the data is genuine the 
integrity property is maintained by allowing the 
recipient of message to identify the message has 
change or not (Betts et al, 2006). The security 
tools that can ensure the integrity such as digital 
timestamping to provide timestamp integrity 
(Betts et al, 2006), digital signature and 
biometric for integrity of record (Betts et al, 
2006) and secure sockets layer (SSL) for 
communication integrity (Betts et al, 2006).       
Availability ensuring that authorized parties can 
enter the system and access the data. In e-
Tendering, the availability of computer system 
to hold the tender offer is essential. The 
availability of the tender box is crucial in the e-
Tendering process (Betts et al, 2006). The 
reliability of the electronic tender box should 
exceed that of the physical tender box. One of 
the major concerns which principals and 
tenderers have of moving to the e-Tendering 
process is the issue of the electronic tender box 
not being available at the close of the tender.  
VI. OVERVIEW OF MISUSE CASE 
Misuse case is the inverse of a use case 
(Sindre&Opdahl, 2000). Despite that,misuse 
case has a similar characteristic like original use 
case. Therefore it promotes a same benefit for 
allowing stakeholder with a non-technical 
background to involve in the security 
requirement development process (El-Attar & 
Ahmad, 2011). Similar to use case development, 
the misuse cases provides a systematic way for 
the elicitation of both functional and non-
functional requirements (Alexander, 2003). 
This modeling tool was introduced by 
Sindre&Opdahl (2000) to represent actions that 
the system should prevent together with those 
Knowledge Management International Conference (KMICe) 2012, Johor Bahru, Malaysia, 4 – 6 July 2012 561 
 
actions which it should support. Misuse cases 
have proven to be reliable in bringing out 
possible security requirement in the system (El-
Attar & Ahmad, 2011) which is suitable when 
developing a secure system. 
This model has two representations, graphical 
diagram and textual template (Matulevicius, 
Mayer & Heymans, 2008). Both of it come with 
a security requirements process 
(Sindre&Opdahl, 2000; Sindre&Opdahl, 2005) 
which consists of 1) identifying critical assets, 2) 
defining security goals, 3) identifying threats, 4) 
identifying and analyzing risks, and 5) defining 
security requirements. 
Graphical Misuse Cases.The use case illustrate a 
set of actions during system take place, which 
yields an observable result that is of value for 
one or more actors, or stakeholders of the 
system. To show a use case contains the action 
define in another use case, include relationship 
are used. As the inverse of the use case, Fig. 3 
represent a misuse case diagram consisting “a 
sequence of actions, including variants, which a 
system or user inadvertently or unintentionally 
interact with the subject that causing harm to 
some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to 
complete” (Sindre&Opdahl, 2000). The misdeed 
are classified as threaten relationship while the 
mitigate relationship specify security 
countermeasure against a misuse case (e.g., 
digital certificate). 
Textual template. The details of use cases are 
usually captured in the associated textual 
templates. Templates are important because they 
encourage developers to write clear and simple 
action sequences. A lightweight description is 
embedded in an ordinary template and extends it 
with additional entries for threat specification. 
An extensive description supports a detailed 
analysis of security threats in a dedicated 
template (Sindre&Opdahl, 2000). 
VII. CO STRUCTI G WITH MISUSE 
CASES 
In this section we demonstrate how misuse cases 
can be used for security risk management 
(Feather et al, 1997) in the e-tendering process 
for tender advertisement and tender submission 
only. Since, constructing all the process 
available in e-tendering will be tedious 
andcomplex. Therefore, this paper only focused 
on a few use cases such as Advertise Tender, 
View Tender Advertisement, Register Tender, 
Download Tender Specification, and Submit 
Tender Document. The possible threats that 
might attack the tendering processes are 
representing by misuse case. The misuse case is 
one of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
notation that can be used to represent threat in 
the use case diagram. 
 
The steps of constructing misuse cases as 
follow: 
(a)Context and Asset Identification.Figure 1 
represent a context of advertisement and 
submitting tender process. The Principal will 
advertise the tender to inform the tender about 
available tender.  Then tenderer, view the 
available tender and register to preferred tender. 
Next the system will let tenderer download the 
document specification at the same time the 
system will record the registration. After 
complete the tender document, tenderer will 
submit it through the system before the due date. 
 
Figure 1. Tendering Process (Advertise and Submit 
Tender) Use Case Modeling  
 
(b) Security objective determination. Use case 
cannot be use to show the vulnerable assets and 
security criteria in the diagram. It’s only can be 
used to tell the reason about the security criteria. 
This paper concentrating on threeprocesses: 
i)receiving tender document by principal; ii) 
ensuring the integrity of tender advertisement;  
and iii) tender submission, meaningthat once the 
tender advertisement is published, andthe tender 
document is submitted its cannot be changed. 
Tenderer
Principal
Advertise Tender
View Tender Advertisment
Download Tender Specification
Register Tender
Submit Tender Document
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
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(c) Risk analysis and assessment. In Figure 2 
showsthe threat modeling in that might be 
happened in the tendering process specifically 
during the advertising and submitting tender 
process. The threats are represented by misuse 
casesfor. The Attacker in this misuse case 
threatens the identity of the principal and 
integrity of the advertisement which can lead to 
fake advertisement. The Attackermight 
threatening the confidentiality of the information 
duringtender submission process. They are not 
only stealing the submitted tender information 
but also can modifying the content. For the side 
of tenderer, the attacker stealing the tenderer’s 
identity, submitting fake tender or stealing 
tender specification. The attacker also might 
change the tender closing time during the tender 
document submission. Therefore, the late tender 
document can be submitted into the principal 
database.    
 (d) Risk treatment. The misuse cases do not 
suggest any risk treatment. However mitigate 
relationship are use to specify treatment for each 
particular risk. 
(e) Security requirements definition. The use 
case in Figure 2 shows the possible threats that 
might attacked the tendering process. The 
identified treats and possible solution for the e-
tendering system are adapted from Haslinaet 
al.(2011). The security solution is not available 
for this misuse case.In Figure 3, each threat has 
its own mitigate relation. This mitigate relation 
act as countermeasure for specific threat that can 
reduce the effect of that venerability.  
(f) Control selection and implementation. 
Misuse cases do not suggest any techniques to 
select and implement controls. 
 
 
Figure 2.Threat Modeling of e-Tendering System. 
Tenderer
Principal
Advertise Tender
View Tender Advertisment
Download Tender Specification
Register Tender
Submit Tender Document
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
Impersonate as Principal
<<threaten>>
Steal tender information<<threaten>>
Impersonate as Tenderer
<<threaten>>
Altering submit time
<<threaten>>
Modified information
<<threaten>>
<<threaten>>
Attacker
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Figure 3. Modeling of Security Requirement of e-Tendering System 
 
CO CLUSIO  
Retaining the accountability and security trust as 
conventional tendering process is important, 
therefore e-tendering system are required to be 
capable in deliver the same quality value. Apart 
of ethical issue threat, the developer should 
consider technological factor that may create 
hole for malicious party to invade or attack the 
system. In addition e-tendering system must 
consider several security mechanisms to curb 
several ethical issues like repudiation via 
applying digital signature and so forth. This 
research paper sought to integrate a secure 
practice in the available tender process body. 
These are only some examples of security issues 
in e-tendering that might need to utilize 
varietysecurity mechanisms to overcome this 
interrelated security problem.  Without proper 
planning, the system might cause security hole 
and cost consuming. In whole view, the 
developer should consider on security issues and 
threat like confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
non repudiation and authentication which 
interrelated among itself and involving 
organization practice and regulations. In this 
paper, misuse case is designed to portray the 
mapping between the security risk in tendering 
phase and countermeasure to overcome the 
security problem. Thus by using mitigate 
relationship feature, it is able to show that what 
a user can do or enforce to curb these misdeeds. 
From this misuse case, the designer able to 
Tenderer
Principal
Advertise Tender
View Tender Advertisment
Download Tender Specification
Register Tender
Submit Tender Document
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
Impersonate as Principal
<<threaten>>
Steal tender information
<<threaten>>
Impersonate as Tenderer
<<threaten>>
Altering submit time
<<threaten>>
Modified information
<<threaten>>
Attacker
Perform Secure Socket Layer
Perform digital time stamping
Using Digital Signature
Use Digital Certificate
<<include>>
<<mitigates>>
<<include>>
<<mitigates>>
<<include>>
<<mitigates>>
<<include>> <<mitigates>>
<<include>>
<<mitigates>>
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clarify and tell technical and non-technical 
people what happen in e-tendering system 
(similarly to the use case function) in enforcing 
security mechanism to produced a secure e-
tendering system.  
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